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Abstract 
 
Using an econometric procedure that corrects for both self-selection of individuals into 
their preferred compensation scheme and wage endogeneity, this study investigates 
whether significant differences exist in the job satisfaction of individuals receiving 
performance-related pay (PRP) compared to those on alternative compensation plans.  
Using data from four waves of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), it is found 
that PRP exerts a positive effect on the mean job satisfaction of (very) high-paid workers 
only.  A potential explanation for this pattern could be that for lower-paid employees 
PRP is perceived to be controlling, whereas higher-paid workers derive a utility benefit 
from what they regard as supportive reward schemes.  Using PRP as an incentive device 
in the UK could therefore be counterproductive in the long run for certain low-paid 
occupations.    
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1. Introduction  
When faced with the classical agency problem, whereby the interests of the worker 
and the firm are misaligned, reward mechanisms will be designed in such a way that 
induces employees to act in their employers’ best interests.  Mirlees (1976) and 
Holmström (1979) were among the first to demonstrate the theoretical dominance of 
performance-related pay (PRP) over alternative reward systems when monitoring effort 
is costly and imperfect.  Indeed, such incentive schemes have increasingly found favour 
in many organisations in the UK, as well as in many other advanced economies.  In 
fact, the widespread use of incentive rewards in boardroom pay deals in the private 
sector, as noted by Murphy (1999), has now also become common practice in the 
public sector.  For example, the use of explicit incentives to enhance the provision of 
public sector services is an important component of the UK Government’s public 
service modernisation agenda (Burgess and Ratto, 2003). 
 Notwithstanding the substantial insights that agency analysis has offered with 
respect to resolving the problem of ‘moral hazard’ in the workplace, a number of 
shortcomings have now been pointed out.  The thrust of these arguments is that the 
introduction of incentive pay schemes may lead to non-optimal responses, with adverse 
consequences especially in jobs where workers make substantial unobservable 
contributions to the value of the firm.  For example, rewarding workers based only on a 
subset of tasks may induce them to manipulate the compensation system to their 
advantage, a phenomenon referred to as “multitasking” by Holmström and Milgrom 
(1991) and Baker (1992).  In this case the worker will direct his entire effort towards 
those activities that are directly rewarded, to the detriment of other equally valuable 
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tasks for the firm.  Subjective appraisal has been heralded as a solution to this problem 
as it can take a holistic view of performance, encompassing the totality of contributions 
by workers.  However, subjective performance evaluation is no less contentious.  
Supervisors may be more lenient in their evaluations in order to avoid conflicts, 
generating what Prendergast (1999) refers to as “centrality” or “leniency” bias.  On the 
other hand, workers may attempt to creep up to their supervisors in order to influence 
their subjective evaluation and hence derive personal advantage.  Added to these 
problems are assertions that financial incentives are likely to undermine collaboration 
and team work, emphasize the power asymmetry between management and workforce, 
and reduce risk taking, creativity and innovation (Kohn, 1993).  
In addition to the aforementioned objections to incentive pay, there are also 
concerns that were firstly identified in the social psychology literature.  The contention 
is that the use of extrinsic incentives may erode intrinsic motivation and satisfaction, 
which will ultimately have counterproductive effects on productivity and profitability 
(Deci, 1971; Lepper et al, 1973).  These claims, which constitute ‘one of the most 
important anomalies in economics’ (Frey and Jegen, 2001), have, nonetheless, not been 
mirrored in the empirical evidence reported by economists.  For example, Lazear 
(2000) shows significant positive effects of incentive pay on productivity (in the range 
of a 44-percent gain) in his unique dataset of a firm (Safelite Glass Co.) that underwent 
changes in its compensation practices.  Nevertheless, it may be that economists have 
identified the short run benefits of incentives, and any long run negative effects on 
motivation and job satisfaction postulated by psychologists have yet to be witnessed in 
the data.  
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A careful examination of the link between PRP and job satisfaction may therefore 
unveil significant insights into the workings of incentive pay, and the manner in which 
it affects productivity in the longer run.  In addition, since the choice of compensation 
strategies by firms is likely to reflect their optimal weighting of costs and benefits given 
the nature of their production technology, it is expected that the aggregate workforce 
will be sorted into jobs that offer PRP and those that pay straight salaries.  Therefore, it 
is the primary aim of this paper to examine how the increasingly changing nature of 
compensation methods has affected attitudes towards jobs by otherwise similar 
individuals.  To do so we follow the practice of an ever-increasing number of 
economists who use self-reported job satisfaction data to proxy workers’ perceptions of 
the quality of their jobs.  Based on the theoretical underpinnings of economic and 
psychological models no unambiguous prediction regarding the difference in job 
satisfaction between workers receiving PRP and those that do not can be made a priori.  
Nonetheless, the disparity in the psychological processes and in the workplace 
experiences facing the two types of workers leads to the expectation that the salient 
determinants of job satisfaction are not the same for both groups.  There are therefore 
good reasons to believe that various socio-economic determinants exert a differential 
impact on the job satisfaction determination processes of workers on alternative 
compensation schemes.           
One such determinant is the absolute wage that workers receive in exchange for 
their effort, which is also the one that is most likely to differ among workers on 
dissimilar reward schemes.  Taking into account its relative importance among the set 
of variables affecting job satisfaction, the analysis that follows has also attempted to 
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correct for the endogenous nature of the income-job satisfaction relationship.  This 
constitutes another important contribution of this paper, as the majority of the literature 
on job satisfaction has usually assumed exogeneity in the independent variables.   
This paper is therefore an investigation of differences in work attitudes between 
individuals who receive PRP and those who are rewarded with other methods of pay, 
having controlled for the endogeneity in wages.  It builds on the earlier work of 
Pouliakas and Theodossiou (2004) who show that a significant difference in the job 
satisfaction of PRP and non-PRP workers exists, once one corrects for the simultaneous 
relationship between job satisfaction, incentives and wages.  However, in that paper no 
interaction was allowed between the individual’s pay status and other characteristics.  
In contrast, by undertaking a separate analysis for PRP and non-PRP employees this 
study succeeds in revealing their utility differences across the full spectrum of wages.  
Using waves 8 to 11 of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), and after plotting 
the ‘predicted job satisfaction-wage’ profiles of the two types of workers, a scissor-
shaped graph is uncovered which shows that PRP has a beneficial impact on the job 
utility of (very) high-paid workers only.          
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.  In the next section a brief 
review of the literature on subjective well-being will be presented, followed by an 
examination of the theoretical predictions regarding the incentives-job satisfaction 
relationship.  In section 3 the data is described and summary statistics are displayed.  
Section 4 details the econometric methodology used in the paper.  The econometric 
estimates of the job satisfaction regressions for the two types of workers are then 
presented in section 5.  Finally, conclusions are offered in section 6. 
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2. Well-being, Job Satisfaction and Incentives  
 
2.1 Subjective Well-Being and Job Satisfaction  
 
A surge of interest among economists in recent years regarding the use of 
subjective well-being (SWB) survey questions has led to a broad consensus that these 
can be used as an empirical proxy for the theoretical concept of ‘utility’.  Though this is 
in direct contrast to the axiom of revealed preferences that has dominated traditional 
microeconomic thinking, this initiative has followed the pioneering work of 
psychologists who have long verified that different measures of SWB are often 
mutually consistent.  Indicatively, Kahneman et al (1997) showed that self-reported 
SWB is correlated with the evaluation of the individual’s experience by a third party 
observer, while Kahneman et al (1999) showed that SWB varied with physiological 
measures of changes in facial muscles, such as the amount of smiling or frowning.  
Moreover, Van Praag (1991) demonstrated that members of the same language 
community tend to display a degree of homogeneity in their understanding of the 
concepts of welfare, well-being and happiness.  Nonetheless, problems associated with 
the use of subjective happiness data have been identified.  These include the adaptation 
phenomenon (Easterlin, 2001) and the potential divergence between remembered utility 
and experienced utility (Kahneman et al, 1999).   
More importantly, the justification for studying subjective assessments of job 
satisfaction is that they have been found to be strongly correlated with observable 
employee events and actions, such as quits, absenteeism and worker productivity 
(Freeman, 1978; Clegg, 1983).  Recently, numerous interesting findings appear to have 
emerged in the literature.  For example, unemployed individuals consistently report 
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substantially lower levels of well-being than the employed, and their level of well-being 
is permanently ‘scared’ as a consequence of their unemployment experience (Clark and 
Oswald, 1994; Theodossiou, 1998).  The judgement of individuals about their own past 
and future financial situation is also important (Easterlin, 2001; Lydon and Chevalier, 
2002).  Furthermore, the relative wage is also shown to be significant as far as job 
satisfaction is concerned (Clark and Oswald, 1996; Clark, 1999; Grund and Sliwka, 
2003).  With regard to personal characteristics, the key results to have emerged are that 
males tend to have lower levels of job satisfaction than females (Clark, 1997), union 
members are less satisfied with their jobs compared to non-union members 
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 1999; Drakopoulos and Theodossiou, 1997), there is a U-
shaped age effect (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1999), and the most highly educated are 
the least satisfied in their jobs (Clark and Oswald, 1996; Sloane and Williams, 1996).  
 
2.2 Incentives and Job Satisfaction  
 
While the literature on happiness and well-being has advanced at a rapid pace, and the 
theory of firms’ choice of incentive contracts is firmly rooted in the agency problem, 
formal theoretical consideration of the impact of financial incentives on job satisfaction 
appears to be irrelevant from an economic perspective.  The reason is that due to the 
fundamental economic assumption of disutility of effort, employers who adopt PRP 
schemes should compensate for the disutility of the extra effort (plus the risk bearing 
costs) by offering higher wages on average.  Thus, the (reservation) utility of individuals 
who receive performance-enhancing pay should, in equilibrium, be equal to that of non-
recipients. 
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Nevertheless, once the assumption of the selfish homo economicus is relaxed, and the 
possibility that an agent may perform an activity due to the fact that it is inherently 
enjoyable (over some range) is acknowledged, the influence of an external reward on 
individual job satisfaction becomes less clear-cut.  Allowing for the fact that rational 
individuals may receive an intrinsic satisfaction from their jobs raises the possibility that 
extrinsic intervention may trigger psychological responses that will alter the agent’s 
utility from work.  This forms the basis of cognitive evaluation theory (Deci and Ryan, 
1985), which asserts that the ultimate effect of performance-contingent compensation on 
the intrinsic motivation to perform a task depends on its impact on perceived self-
determination and esteem.  Thus, it has been argued that if incentives are perceived by 
individuals as being supportive, they facilitate worker autonomy and foster self-esteem, 
thus enlarging self-determination.  In that case intrinsic motivation is crowded-in, and 
PRP schemes should enhance inherent job satisfaction.  In contrast, rewards that are 
regarded as controlling, or as intended to coax the individual into performing an activity, 
are likely to cause a shift in the attributed cause of the behaviour from an internal to an 
external source.  With such a shift in the locus of control, tying wages to performance 
indicators will crowd-out the utility that employees derive from the work itself (the 
‘hidden cost of reward’).3  For either of these reasons it is expected that monetary 
inducements are unlikely to have a neutral effect on the subjective job satisfaction scores 
of individuals.4  This conclusion is reinforced by expectancy-based theories of motivation 
in psychology (Lawler and Porter, 1967), which assert that attitudes about work are 
                                                 
3 More recently Benabou and Tirole (2003) also allowed for the possibility that incentive rewards, by 
affecting an agent’s uncertain information set concerning the nature of a task or his/her self-confidence, 
may have a positive effect on employee welfare in the short-run, but counterproductive in the long-run. 
4 See Kreps (1997), Frey (1997) and Fehr and Falk (2002) for excellent discussions regarding the 
relevance and application of such theories for economics. 
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shaped from the rewards produced by performance, which are valued outcomes in 
themselves (Judge et al., 2001, p. 378).       
Standard economic theory also fails to account for the fact that PRP will, in all 
likelihood, alter the recipient’s relative status.  The idea that reference-dependent 
preferences (whereby some arguments of the utility function are relative, rather than 
absolute) describe human behaviour more accurately is now firmly ingrained in the 
literature of well-being.5  Thus, if job utility depends on both the level of pay and on pay 
relative to some reference point or aspiration level, it is clear that incentive pay could 
significantly affect job satisfaction through both of these routes.   
Finally, given the overwhelming evidence that workers attach an equal (or even 
greater) value to other facets of their jobs besides wages and hours worked, it is to be 
expected that PRP will affect overall attitudes towards work by influencing individual 
perceptions of the security of employment, of inter-personal relationships and of equity 
and fairness, among others.  
The analysis above therefore highlights the ambiguous theoretical impact of 
performance-related pay (PRP) on overall job satisfaction, whilst emphasizing that 
other socio-economic factors are likely to exert dissimilar influences on the utility of 
otherwise identical workers who are rewarded under different payment schemes.  We 
now turn to the empirical analysis of this paper in order to test whether this hypothesis 
holds.    
                                                 
5 Nonetheless, contention exists among economists as to what is exactly the comparison or aspiration 
benchmark against which individuals compare their utility.  While Clark and Oswald (1996) have assumed 
that well-being measures are inversely related to a comparison income defined as the econometrically 
predicted ‘going rate’ for the job, that is the income of comparable employees of given characteristics, 
Clark (1999) and Grund and Sliwka (2003) have recently argued that it is the wage of the prior period that 
serves as reference. 
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3. An overview of the data 
 
This paper uses data from waves eight to eleven of the British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS).  The BHPS is a nationally representative survey that each year 
interviews a random sample of nearly 10,000 individuals in approximately 5,500 
British households, the addresses of which are taken from the National Postcode 
Address File.  The cumulative attrition in the BHPS has been shown to be of a limited 
magnitude such that it does not lead to serious inference bias (Nathan, 1999; cited in 
Gardner and Oswald, 2001).  It contains a wealth of information on employees’ 
personal and employment characteristics.  Respondents in employment are also asked 
about their satisfaction with seven specific facets of their jobs (promotion prospects, 
total pay, relations with supervisors, job security, ability to work on their own initiative, 
the actual work itself and hours of work) evaluated on a seven point scale (where a 
value of one corresponds to ‘not satisfied at all’ and seven reflects ‘complete 
satisfaction’).  The questions regarding promotion prospects, relations with boss, and 
the use of initiative were discontinued after the seventh wave.  Individuals are also 
asked to rate their overall job satisfaction on the same seven-point scale.  As in most 
empirical work in this field, this study employs these job satisfaction questions to 
identify the determinants of the quality of employment as perceived by the individual 
workers themselves.    
In this paper the sample is restricted to individuals between 16 and 65 years of age 
who are in employment (both full and part-time) at the survey date.  Those who are 
self-employed, retired, work in the armed forces and live in Northern Ireland are 
excluded.  For waves 8 to 11 of the BHPS this yields 26,585 observations on 9,831 
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different individuals.  A sizeable portion of this sample (16.26%) corresponds to 
individuals that replied affirmatively to the question: “Does your pay include 
performance related pay”? 
Table 1 contains the characteristics of employees with and without PRP.  The 
percentage of male workers is higher among those receiving PRP than it is among those 
on alternative wage schemes.  Employees whose remuneration is linked to their 
performance are also more likely to be younger, have union coverage at their 
workplace, in full-time and permanent jobs offering promotion and career opportunities 
(in the sense that wages rise on an incremental scale) and in larger firms.  They are also 
found primarily among managerial/administrative and clerical/secretarial occupations 
and in the private sector or the Civil Service.  No major differences exist with respect to 
educational qualifications and marriage/partner status.      
The distribution of overall job satisfaction by type of employee is displayed in 
Figure 1.  While a higher proportion of employees receiving incentive pay state the 
satisfaction values of 3 or 5, it appears that a larger percentage of workers on other pay 
systems consider themselves as completely satisfied (level equal to 7).  It is also evident 
that there is a bunching of employee responses towards the higher satisfaction 
categories.      
Finally, to gain some insight into the correlations in the raw data, Table 2 presents 
the means of overall job satisfaction over some of the characteristics of interest for this 
study, broken down by method of pay.  The data demonstrate that regardless of pay 
status men are less satisfied with their jobs than women, there is a U-shaped effect of 
age on job satisfaction, and that no union coverage, promotion and career opportunities, 
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and part-time employment lead to higher average satisfaction levels.  This is also true 
for those individuals with a partner, on permanent jobs and in smaller firms.  
Comparing the two types of employees now, one can see that for most categories the 
mean satisfaction of individuals on non-PRP rewards is higher than of those receiving 
PRP.  Nonetheless, this is not the case for higher educated employees, those with non-
permanent contracts and those who work in the NHS/Higher education sector.    
4. Econometric Methodology 
 For the rest of the paper a multivariate regression methodology is employed in 
order to uncover the true ceteris paribus influence of the explanatory variables on job 
satisfaction.  As noted above, it is expected that the aggregate workforce will be sorted 
into jobs that offer PRP and those that pay other salaries, since the compensation 
strategies of firms should reflect their optimal evaluation of costs and benefits given the 
nature of their production technology.  Moreover, since the provision of incentive pay 
is likely to trigger significant disparities in the psychological reactions and in the 
workplace experiences facing the two types of workers, one expects that the salient 
determinants of job satisfaction will not be the same for both groups.  Of course, 
although within the same type of worker category there may be some distinction in the 
manner in which incentives affect individual attitudes to work, made more probable by 
the fact that our measure of PRP does not distinguish between the many alternative 
reward methods that are available (e.g. bonuses, commissions, merit pay etc.), the 
assumption is made that similar forces should operate within the same type.  Thus, in 
the analysis that follows the overall sample has been split into PRP and non-PRP sub-
samples.  
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  Given the decision to separate workers according to their method of pay, a 
Heckman-type model is employed in order to correct for the incidental truncation 
problem that arises.  Specifically, as Lazear’s (1986) ‘sorting’ model has convincingly 
illustrated, when examining the consequences of incentive contracts self-selection by 
workers into their preferred pay scheme is likely to occur.  In Lazear’s model jobs with 
PRP attract workers of higher ability, which is likely to be unobservable to the survey 
statistician.  It follows that if selectivity is not taken into account an OLS regression using 
the selected sub-samples will lead to inconsistent estimates (Heckman, 1979).  Thus, in 
order to correct for this problem this paper utilizes a model commonly known as a 
“switching regression with endogenous switching”.  This procedure was most notably 
espoused by Lee (1978). 
The switching regression model consists of two job satisfaction equations (JS), one 
for each type of worker (i = 1,…, N; j = PRP and other): 
 
 
    PRPikPRPiPRPiPRPi uWJS ++= ββX   (1) 
 
oikoioioi uWJS ++= γγX  (2) 
 
  
and one “selection equation” which determines which sector individuals choose: 
 
 
iii vPRP += δZ*  (3) 
 
 
 
where from equations (1) and (2) Xji is a [1 x (K-1)] vector of exogenous variables 
believed to influence the job satisfaction of individual i, Wji denotes the log of real gross 
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hourly earnings adjusted for overtime6, β and γ are associated (K x 1) coefficients, and uji 
are the random error terms with E(uji) = 0 and Cov(Xji, uji) = 0.  Moreover, from equation 
(3) PRPi* is a latent variable which describes the agent’s propensity of joining either 
compensation scheme, Zi is a (1 x q) vector of all exogenous variables in the model (with 
at least one determining the employee’s selection, but excluded from the structural JS 
equations i.e. ), and v is the disturbance term with Cov(Zi, v) = 0 and v ~ N(0,1).  
Of course, PRPi* is unobserved, but we know that: 
Kq ≥
 
 
0*1 >= ii PRPiffPRP  (4) 
 
0*0 ≤= ii PRPiffPRP  (5) 
 
 
 
Thus, our observed job satisfaction data are defined as follows: 
 
 
1== iPRPii PRPiffJSJS  (6) 
 
0== ioii PRPiffJSJS  (7) 
 
                                                 
6 The logarithm of the hourly wage was constructed in a standard manner as follows: 
 
 
]})3.1(33.4[ln{ iiii HOURSOTPDHOURSPAYGUW +=  
 
where PAYGU is the usual gross pay per month in the current job (including regular bonuses and 
commissions associated with PRP systems but excluding one-off payments such as Christmas bonuses or 
redundancy payments), deflated by 1991 prices, HOURS is number of hours normally worked per week, 
and HOURSOTPD is paid overtime hours of individual i (where we assume that each hour of overtime is 
paid at 1.3 times the standard hourly rate).  
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and it is evident that since 0)0*/(,0)0*/( ≠≤≠> ioiiPRPi PRPuEPRPuE  and Cov(uj, v) 
= ρ, estimation by OLS will result in inconsistency. 
In order to consistently estimate β and γ a Heckman two-step procedure is therefore 
required.  In the first step the selection equation (3) is estimated using the probit method, 
given the binary nature of the PRP variable.  The estimated coefficients from this 
equation, , are then used for the calculation of the inverse Mills ratios (one for each 
group), as is illustrated below: 
δˆ
 
 
)ˆ(
)ˆ(),( δZ
δZ
i
i
iPRPiPRPi vuCov Φ×=
ϕλ  
 
 
 
(9) 
)ˆ(1
)ˆ(),( δZ
δZ
i
i
ioioi vuCov Φ−×=
ϕλ  (10) 
 
 
 
 
In the second step the job satisfaction equations are estimated including the 
respective Mills ratios as independent variables, as follows: 
 
 
PRPiPRPikPRPiPRPiPRPi WJS ηλβ +−+= βX  (11) 
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oioikoioioi WJS ηλγ +++= γX  (12) 
 
 
The estimated coefficients of β and γ should now provide consistent estimates of the 
marginal effect of Xji and Wji on JSji.  This will not be the case, however, if Wji and JSji 
are endogenously determined, implying that 0)}(,{ ≠jijiji oruWCov η .  In fact, it is 
reasonable to expect that wages and job satisfaction belong to a simultaneous system, 
given that ever since Adam Smith advocated his theory of ‘compensating differences’ it 
has been well understood that wages and utility are interlinked.  It also seems plausible 
that attitudes towards the job (such as job satisfaction) should be related to behaviours on 
the job (such as performance), with subsequent consequences for wages (Fishbein, 1973; 
cited in Judge et al., 2001, p. 378).  It is therefore evident that correcting for endogeneity 
is necessary if one wishes to identify the correct effect of Wji on JSji.   
For this reason equations (11) and (12) have been estimated using the Two-Stage-
Least-Squares (TSLS) methodology, where the first stage consists of the OLS estimation 
of the following two reduced form equations of wages: 
 
jijqjijjijiW εξλ ++= +1ξZ  (13) 
 
 
As before the matrix Zji contains all exogenous variables in the model, one of which is 
correlated with Wji but does not appear in the structural JS equations, while εji are the 
random disturbance terms of the reduced form equations.  Using the estimated 
coefficients from these regressions fitted values of earnings for each individual are then 
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obtained.  These predictions, henceforth denoted by , are subsequently included in the 
main job satisfaction equations (11) and (12) in place of the Wji variables: 
jiWˆ
 
jijijkjijjiji WJS ωλψ +−+= ˆψX  (14) 
 
 
 
Wooldridge (2002, p. 567) illustrates that this TSLS procedure with the inverse Mills 
ratio added to the regressors is consistent.  Of course, in order to fulfil the identification 
requirements the chosen identifying restrictions Zi need to be orthogonal to the structural 
model - E(Zi′ηji) = 0 (the exogeneity condition), but sufficiently partially correlated with 
Wji (the rank condition).  The importance of satisfying this latter condition has been 
highlighted by Bound et al. (1995), who showed that, despite large sample sizes, when 
the instruments are only weakly associated with the endogenous regressors, even a weak 
Cov(Zi, ηji) can lead to large inconsistencies (and finite sample biases) in IV estimates.  
More recently Staiger and Stock (1997) and Stock et al. (2002) have shown that the 
relative bias of TSLS methods (relative to the inconsistency of OLS) is approximately 
inversely proportional to the concentration parameter matrix µ2 i.e. the population 
analogue to the first-stage F statistic testing the significance of the instruments Zi in the 
reduced form equations (13).  They show that with one endogenous regressor a minimum 
requirement for conducting reliable TSLS inference is that the F statistics in the first-
stage regressions are larger than 9.  
It is not a straightforward task to come up with valid instruments that satisfy these 
conditions, which may partly explain why much of the job satisfaction literature has 
overlooked the problem.  To the knowledge of the authors only three studies (Lydon and 
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Chevalier, 2002; Mavromaras and McAvinchey, 2004; Pouliakas and Theodossiou, 2004) 
have relaxed the assumption of weak exogeneity of the wage variable.  In this paper, 
since the emphasis is on correcting for selectivity whilst also taking into account the 
endogeneity of W, identification requires at least two exclusion restrictions in the 
structural JS equations.  Consequently, and in order to identify the second moments of the 
structural coefficients, four variables have been included in the Zi matrix in addition to 
Xi, so that Z = [z1: z2: X], where z1 are the variables determining selection and z2 are 
those that serve as instruments for W.  In practice the distinction between z1 and z2 is not 
important, since all of these variables appear in the selection equation and as instruments 
in estimating (11) and (12).  We have therefore added in Z a dummy variable (SPPT) 
indicating whether the spouse/partner works part-time (1-30 hours), on the grounds that 
features of the spouse can act as reasonable proxies for the individual’s unobserved 
characteristics (what has become known as Becker’s assortative matching argument).  
Two indicators of an index describing the possession of basic consumer durables in the 
household (CDINDX) were also incorporated.  The final restriction used is a dummy 
variable representing whether the vehicle owned by the household is privately or 
company-owned (CAROWN).  The choice of this variable was motivated by the usual 
modus operandi of British firms to offer company vehicles to individuals in managerial 
or sales occupations, who are also most likely to be recipients of incentive reward 
schemes.  For all of these identifying restrictions it is believed that while they are 
correlated with individuals’ choice of method of pay and their actual pay, there is no 
compelling reason for them to be endogenous to job satisfaction.  Indeed, the extensive 
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statistical tests that have been undertaken (discussed in detail below) indicate that the 
restrictions for identifying the endogeneity effects are adequate.    
Before reporting the empirical estimates three technical issues need to be addressed.  
Firstly, in the absence of any appropriate econometric software that would compute 
Heckman and IV estimators of ordered latent response models, the decision was taken to 
follow Freeman’s (1978) suggestion of approximating job satisfaction with a 
standardized z-score transformation.  By measuring the number of standard deviations 
between a given response and the mean, this procedure enables the utilization of linear 
estimation methods.  Secondly, given that the Var(JSji / PRPi = 0,1) may not be constant, 
robust (Hubert-White) standard errors are reported which have also been adjusted for 
clustering at the individual level.  Finally, if selectivity effects are present the standard 
errors of ψj after embarking on the TSLS procedure are likely to suffer from 
inconsistency, as they fail to take into account the estimation error in the generated 
regressor λj (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 568).  In order to tackle this problem we have 
therefore bootstrapped the data with 1000 replications.  
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Correcting for Self-Selection 
Table A1 in the Appendix describes the results (and marginal effects at the means of 
Z) of equation (3), the bivariate probit of performance pay.  It is evident that the 
restrictions for identifying the selection equation are significant.  Individuals of 
households that possess more consumer durables are more likely to be members of 
contingent pay schemes, other things equal.  In addition, it appears that the probability of 
receiving incentive pay is reduced for those individuals whose spouse works in part-time 
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employment.  Finally, our intuition that company ownership of the household vehicle 
should be positively correlated with PRP is confirmed.  All of these instruments are 
statistically significant variables in the PRP selection regression at the 5% level, while a 
test of their joint insignificance is clearly rejected at the 1% level (χ2 (4) = 25.7 >  χ2critical 
(4) = 13.27). 
The remaining control variables have generally expected signs.  Working long hours 
(‘burning the midnight oil’) and in larger firms raises the probability of a worker 
receiving PRP, in accordance with Brown’s (1990) observation that piece-rate systems 
entail fixed costs that can be spread more evenly over more workers in large 
establishments.7  This also seems to be the case for trade union members, thus implying 
that British unions opt for PRP systems to protect their workers against supervisory 
discretion at the cost of solidarity-enhancing wage equality.  The probability of receiving 
PRP is also positively related to whether the employee has promotion prospects at his 
current employment, or whether his or her salary increases on an incremental scale, thus 
indicating complementarities in the manner in which incentive devices are utilized by 
British firms.  In contrast, age, health status, and sex do not seem to be correlated with 
the likelihood of PRP.8  Finally, it is well known that explicit incentive contracts have 
always been more common in the private than in the public sector (Burgess and Ratto, 
2003), and this is confirmed in our data for the local government and health and higher 
education sectors.  However, it appears that the extension of PRP to practically the whole 
                                                 
7 “Large firms with extensive hierarchies may also have more resources, particularly in terms of 
compensation specialists, to devote to the development of incentive schemes” (McKersie, Miller and 
Quarterman, 1964; cited in Drago and Heywood, 1995, p. 5). 
8 In other words, Goldin’s (1986) assertion that women are more likely to receive performance pay, since 
the more frequent disruption in their careers makes promotion schemes less effective motivators, is not 
borne out in this data set. 
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of the Civil Service over the last few years (as described by Marsden and Richardson, 
1992) has taken its toll.9       
 
5.2 Determinants of Job Satisfaction by Method of Pay 
From the coefficients of Table A1 the relevant Mills ratios, as described in (9) and 
(10), are obtained, and subsequently included in the estimation by TSLS of the job 
satisfaction equations (11) and (12).  Due to space limitations we refrain from describing 
the results of the reduced form regressions of wages (equation (13)), though the output is 
readily available from the authors upon request.  It suffices to say that the standard 
findings of previous Mincer-type estimations are confirmed, and that the chosen 
instruments satisfy the rank and exogeneity conditions.  Specifically, in the first-stage 
wage regression for workers receiving PRP, the F-statistic testing the joint insignificance 
of the excluded instruments is F(4, 2109) = 17.71, while in the non-PRP wage regression 
it is F(4, 7700) = 38.70.  Both of these clearly satisfy the Staiger and Stock (1997) rule of 
thumb, which requires the first-stage F statistic to be larger than 9 in order to avoid the 
problem of weak identification.  The corresponding Hansen-J statistics of χ2(3) = 1.99 
and χ2(3) = 0.99 for the PRP and non-PRP regressions, respectively, also fail to reject the 
null hypothesis that the selected instruments are valid in these sub-samples.  All of the 
relevant statistical tests hence indicate that the restrictions for identifying the endogeneity 
effects in this study are adequate.     
Table 3 contains the coefficients that are concurrently purged from endogeneity in W 
and adjusted for self-selection bias (equation (14)).  From this table it is clear that the 
                                                 
9 Of course, it still remains the case that for virtually all civil service staff the importance of the 
performance related elements is small in relation to total pay, but the direction of the incidence of such pay 
systems is unambiguous.   
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marginal effect of some of the explanatory variables on the job satisfaction of PRP and 
non-PRP workers differs.  Interestingly, once one controls for the non-causal relationship 
between wages and job satisfaction, absolute pay has no statistical significance for both 
groups of workers.  This result is an agreement with a number of studies that have shown 
that “income not only weakly predicts overall quality of life but also satisfaction in the 
life domain with which income is intimately associated-work” (Malka and Chatman, 
2003, p. 737).  Clark (1999), for example, reports an insignificant coefficient in the 
current pay variable using the first two waves of the BHPS, and interprets this as 
reflective of the fact that reference-dependent preferences describe human behaviour 
more accurately.  Other authors have also shown that actual wages have no significant 
effect on the overall job satisfaction of women (Leontaridi and Sloane, 2001), or on some 
of the facets of job satisfaction (such as security and the actual work itself; see Pouliakas 
and Theodossiou, 2004), which could also help explain our finding. 
Evidence of self-selection is only found among those workers who are not in receipt 
of PRP.  The Mills ratio, an indicator of the extent to which the employees’ 
characteristics affect the satisfaction score they report, is found to be positive and 
statistically significant for this group.  This implies that unobserved characteristics, which 
influence an individual’s decision on whether to opt for non-performance-based schemes, 
have a positive effect on the utility from work once he/she chooses to work in the non-
PRP sector. 
With respect to the remaining independent variables a statistically significant U-
shaped age effect, and negative coefficients for union and full-time workers are only 
found in the non-PRP sub-sample.  Significant negative effects for larger firms, working 
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in the Civil Service, and on the duration of commuting to work are also only observed for 
workers on non-contingent pay.  Similarly, individuals who have a partner, or enjoy good 
health, seem to be happier with their jobs in the non-PRP sector.  In contrast, females, 
workers with career opportunities, and those who have fewer educational qualifications 
are more satisfied with their work regardless of the method of pay.      
 
5.3 Average Job Satisfaction by Method of Pay  
Based on the regression output of Table 3, it is now possible to test whether a 
significant difference in the average job satisfaction, , of the two types 
of workers exists, by comparing the predicted values of (14), 
.  For this purpose the two non-parametric tests of 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) and of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) are employed, 
which test whether the fitted job satisfaction distributions of PRP and non-PRP workers 
(as shown in Figure 2) are statistically different.  While the former test is sensitive to 
differences in the median, dispersion and skewness between the two distributions, the 
latter is more robust to extreme values.  Their values of 0.1015 and 9.780, respectively, 
clearly reject the null of the equality of the distribution functions at the 1% level.  
Moreover, from the WMW test the hypothesis that the values of  are less than 
those of  is rejected at the 1% level.  These results confirm the main proposition of 
this paper i.e. that the provision of performance-related rewards should alter the nature of 
the job satisfaction determination processes of those workers receiving them.  They also 
indicate that the provision of PRP exerts an adverse average effect on the overall utility 
that employees derive from their employment (e.g. 
),/( jijiji XWJSE
jijkjijjiji WXSJ λψψ ˆˆˆˆˆ −+=
noPRPSJ ˆ
PRPSJ ˆ
31.5ˆ24.5ˆ =<= noPRPPRP SJSJ ), 
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provided, of course, that our econometric methodology has controlled for differences in 
observable and unobservable characteristics that affect both the method of pay as well as 
the stated job satisfaction scores of workers. 
By comparing the predicted job satisfaction values of the two types of workers, 
evaluated at the means of the remaining independent variables ( X ), one can also obtain a 
visual display of the varied effect of PRP across the full spectrum of wages.  It is 
interesting to examine jijkjijjiji WXSJ λψψ −+= ˆˆ~  over wages, since PRP has been 
typically preferred as a method of compensation in high-paid occupations (e.g. CEOs, 
managers).  Figure 3, which plots the ‘predicted job satisfaction-wage’ ( WSJ −~ ) profiles 
of PRP and non-PRP workers, offers a potential explanation for this phenomenon, since it 
can be seen that PRP exerts a beneficial effect on the utility of (very) high-paid workers 
only.  From the scissor-shaped graph of Figure 3 it is clear that for a large part of the 
wage distribution workers receiving contingent rewards have lower average job 
satisfaction scores compared to those on other compensation schemes.  The WSJ −~  
profile of PRP workers, however, is steeper, implying that for real wages that are larger 
than approximately £10.80 per hour employees receiving incentives rewards become 
happier.10  Since individuals receiving more than £10.80 per hour in the UK are likely to 
belong to the highest decile of the earnings distribution, we conclude that incentive pay 
has a positive effect on the mean job satisfaction of (very) high-paid workers only.           
                                                 
10 This difference in job satisfaction between workers on alternative remuneration schemes is statistically 
significant, as verified by two independent WMW tests.  Specifically, the null hypothesis that there is no 
significant difference between the predicted job satisfaction scores of workers under different pay systems 
is rejected at the 1% level, both before and after the ‘overtaking’ wage of £10.80.  Furthermore, the WMW 
z-value of 15.661 implies that for wages that are below the threshold of £10.80 non-PRP workers derive 
greater utility from their work, compared to those on contingent pay schemes.  However, once we compare 
those employees who earn more than the threshold, there is a significant difference in job satisfaction in 
favour of those workers who receive performance pay (WMW z-value = –9.187).    
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5.4 Discussion and Satisfaction with Pay 
This prediction might seem to be at odds with the empirical findings of most studies 
investigating the relationship between methods of pay and earnings.  According to these, 
workers earning part (or all) of their income due to explicit incentives have higher mean 
wages than those who are paid hourly rates or salaries (Seiler, 1984; Brown, 1992; Booth 
and Frank, 1999).  This result holds even after the sorting effects of variable pay are 
controlled for by the use of fixed effects regressions (Parent, 1997; Lazear, 2000).  In 
fact, the impact of this difference in wages on individual attitudes can be seen if we 
replicate the analysis of this paper using the ‘satisfaction with earnings’ question as the 
dependent variable.  Table 4 reassuringly indicates that current pay is a significant 
determinant of pay satisfaction, and that the marginal effect of wages is larger for 
individuals receiving PRP than those on alternative pay (though the difference is not 
statistically significant).  Furthermore, from Figure 4, which depicts the average pay 
satisfactions of the two types of workers, a scissor-shaped graph is uncovered as before, 
albeit one in which the crossing point of the two plots is at the much lower real hourly 
wage value of £6.8.11  However, it has to be borne in mind that, as was confirmed by the 
insignificant coefficient of wages in Table 3, the absolute level of pay “tends to be ranked 
relatively lowly in terms of what individual workers claim is important to them in their 
jobs” (Leontaridi and Sloane, 2001, p. 6).  Thus, despite the fact that PRP appears to have 
a positive impact on the pay satisfaction of a much larger fraction of workers, it is 
                                                 
11 Two independent WMW tests confirm once again that there is a significant difference (at the 1% level) in 
the pay satisfactions of workers on alternative wage schemes, with non-PRP workers being more satisfied 
than their PRP counterparts for wages that are below the threshold of £6.8 (WMW z-value = 10.36), while 
the reverse pattern holds for wages that are above the threshold (WMW z-value = -21.768). 
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probable that via its effect on the other facets of jobs it only results in greater overall 
happiness among those workers who are at the top of the earnings distribution. 
In the absence of any clear-cut theoretical predictions regarding the differential 
impact of PRP on the job satisfaction of workers by wage level, in this final section of the 
paper we discuss potential explanations for the pattern that is observed in Figure 3.  The 
finding that at low wages individuals receiving incentive pay derive less utility from their 
jobs is consistent with the idea these workers might perceive such compensation schemes 
as controlling.  In light of recent evidence that low-paid workers in the UK are not 
significantly less satisfied with their jobs compared to high-paid employees (Leontaridi 
and Sloane, 2001; Pouliakas and Theodossiou, 2005[a][b]), presumably because there is 
compensation in the non-monetary features of their jobs, the provision of extrinsic 
incentives may divert the attention of workers away from these non-pecuniary and 
intrinsically rewarding aspects of work.  This effect would be magnified if, in accordance 
with the theory of cognitive dissonance, individuals in low wage jobs feel the need to 
convince themselves that they are doing important work despite the low pay.  Figure 3 
therefore suggests that the negative impact of PRP on the self-attribution of motives by 
low-paid individuals outweighs the more ‘economically-driven’ expectation, which 
would posit that the marginal benefit of extra income should be higher for those workers 
whose basic needs have not been satisfied yet.  In addition, low wage workers are 
expected to suffer from a greater inability to diversify the extra risk that is inherent in the 
variability of PRP wage systems, which is not the case for those employees on the higher 
rungs of the income distribution. 
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Workers enjoying high wages are, instead, more likely to perceive incentive rewards 
as supportive.  “In terms of Maslow’s (1954) hierarchy of needs, excess income can aid 
in the satisfaction of esteem needs because high income implies high competence and 
overall personal worth.  So, even when satisfaction of basic physiological and security 
needs is not an issue, some people will value high income as a marker of competence and 
personal worth” (Malka and Chatman, 2003).  In addition to this, the size of the 
additional rewards that arise from incentive pay might also act as a signal of recognition 
and higher status within the organization for workers who are already high in the 
hierarchy.                
6. Concluding Remarks 
By using an econometric procedure that corrects job satisfaction equations for both 
self-selection of individuals into their preferred compensation scheme and wage 
endogeneity, this study showed that significant differences exist in the average utility that 
individuals derive from their work depending on method of pay.  Investigating these 
differences further also revealed that incentive pay has a positive effect on the mean job 
satisfaction of (very) high-paid workers only.  A potential explanation for this pattern 
could be that for lower-paid employees PRP is perceived to be controlling, whereas 
higher-paid employees derive a utility benefit from what they perceive as supportive 
reward schemes.  Using performance pay as an incentive device in the UK could 
therefore prove to be counterproductive in the long run for certain low-paid occupations.           
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Figure 1 Satisfaction by method of pay
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Figure 2 Kernel densities of predicted job satisfaction by pay status
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Table 1 Characteristics of employees by method of pay 
Characteristics (%) PRP Other 
Male 58.5 47.1 
Female 41.5 52.9 
Age 17-19 3.17 3.93 
Age 20-25 13.35 12.91 
Age 26-35 32.29 26.95 
Age 36-45 27.5 27.35 
Age 46-55 18.32 20.95 
Age 56-65 5.37 7.91 
Union 55.33 48.77 
No Union 44.67 51.23 
Promotion 67.06 47.49 
No promotion 32.94 52.51 
Wage rise 51.21 45.16 
No Wage rise 48.79 54.84 
Full-time 90.01 78.7 
Par-time 9.99 21.3 
Partner 73.65 72.07 
No partner 26.35 27.93 
Educ: no qualifications 7.71 13.17 
Educ: O-level 27.12 28.23 
Educ: A-level 16.2 13.04 
Educ: Other higher 28.07 27.56 
Educ: First/Higher 20.91 18.01 
Contract: permanent 98.29 93.74 
Contract: non-permanent 1.71 6.26 
Size: 1-24 24.64 36.92 
Size: 25-99 23.54 25.21 
Size: 100-499 28.47 21.84 
Size: 500+ 23.35 16.03 
Sector: private 78.02 67.88 
Sector: Civil Service 11.59 2.5 
Sector: Local Govt 5.74 16.03 
Sector: NHS/Higher education 1.5 8.56 
Sector: non-profit organisations 1.25 3.6 
Sector: other 1.9 1.43 
Occupation: Managers and Administrators  22.11 12.12 
Occupation: Professional Occupations  8.91 10.15 
Occupation: Associate professional and Technical 10.83 11.54 
Occupation: Clerical and Secretarial  22.34 17.66 
Occupation: Craft and Related Occupations  10.46 10.09 
Occupation: Personal and Protective Service  3.38 12.48 
Occupation: Sales  8.7 7.46 
Occupation: Plant and machine Operatives  8.31 9.79 
Occupation: Other  4.95 8.73 
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Table 2 Mean reported job satisfaction scores by method of pay 
Characteristics PRP Other 
Male 5.20(1.28) 5.20(1.33) 
Female 5.32(1.30) 5.47(1.26) 
Age 17-19 5.36(1.33) 5.41(1.31) 
Age 20-25 5.17(1.38) 5.24(1.33) 
Age 26-35 5.27(1.24) 5.31(1.28) 
Age 36-45 5.25(1.29) 5.32(1.30) 
Age 46-55 5.24(1.31) 5.37(1.30) 
Age 56-65 5.33(1.28) 5.55(1.26) 
Union 5.19(1.30) 5.29(1.29) 
No Union 5.31(1.27) 5.38(1.31) 
Promotion 5.37(1.19) 5.42(1.21) 
No promotion 5.00(1.43) 5.27(1.37) 
Wage rise 5.34(1.26) 5.43(1.23) 
No Wage rise 5.15(1.31) 5.26(1.34) 
Full-time 5.23(1.29) 5.26(1.31) 
Par-time 5.38(1.26) 5.62(1.20) 
Partner 5.28(1.26) 5.38(1.28) 
No partner 5.18(1.36) 5.25(1.34) 
Educ: no qual 5.34(1.40) 5.49(1.36) 
Educ: O-level 5.30(1.30) 5.39(1.29) 
Educ: A-level 5.13(1.32) 5.31(1.25) 
Educ: Other higher 5.23(1.25) 5.33(1.28) 
Educ: First/Higher 5.26(1.27) 5.20(1.30) 
Contract: permanent 5.25(1.29) 5.36(1.29) 
Contract: non-permanent 5.14(1.34) 5.12(1.39) 
Size: 1-24 5.34(1.27) 5.47(1.27) 
Size: 25-99 5.24(1.35) 5.33(1.29) 
Size: 100-499 5.21(1.27) 5.21(1.31) 
Size: 500+ 5.23(1.26) 5.24(1.30) 
Sector: private 5.25(1.28) 5.31(1.32) 
Sector: Civil Service 5.19(1.26) 5.19(1.34) 
Sector: Local Govt 5.33(1.36) 5.43(1.24) 
Sector: NHS/Higher education 5.58(1.22) 5.44(1.18) 
Sector: non-profit orgs 4.92(1.54) 5.53(1.20) 
Sector: other 5.23(1.46) 5.23(1.47) 
Notes: Standard deviations in parenthesis. 
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Table 3 IV Estimates of Job Satisfaction by Pay Status 
 PRP Other 
 Coef. Std.Error Coef. Std.Error 
Personal/Job vars     
LNPAY 0.398 (0.284) 0.182 (0.152) 
AGE -0.035 (0.020) -0.025 (0.009)** 
AGESQUARE/1000 0.429 (0.230)* 0.341 (0.101)*** 
SEX -0.134 (0.057)** -0.160 (0.030)*** 
HOURS 0.000 (0.004) -0.003 (0.001) 
UNION -0.093 (0.069) -0.163 (0.022)*** 
PERMANENT 0.094 (0.218) 0.034 (0.043) 
PROMOTION 0.304 (0.068)*** 0.179 (0.018)*** 
TRAVELTIME 0.000 (0.001) -0.002 (0.001)** 
PARTNER 0.087 (0.046) 0.049 (0.019)** 
PAY RISE 0.155 (0.042)*** 0.105 (0.016)*** 
SECOND JOB -0.081 (0.075) 0.019 (0.026) 
FULL TIME -0.129 (0.087) -0.156 (0.036)*** 
Human Capital     
O-LEVELS -0.080 (0.083) -0.111 (0.031)*** 
A-LEVELS -0.271 (0.100)** -0.166 (0.038)*** 
OTHER HIGHER -0.236 (0.096)** -0.176 (0.041)*** 
FIRST/HIGHER -0.400 (0.143)** -0.355 (0.066)*** 
Firm Size     
25-99 -0.050 (0.058) -0.097 (0.022)*** 
100-499 -0.069 (0.064) -0.163 (0.026)*** 
500+ -0.078 (0.080) -0.172 (0.032)*** 
Sector     
CIVIL SRV -0.055 (0.202) -0.262 (0.078)*** 
LOCAL GOVT -0.154 (0.174) 0.031 (0.042) 
NHS/HIGHER EDU -0.101 (0.306) 0.115 (0.052)* 
OTHER  0.006 (0.149) -0.021 (0.069) 
NON-PROFIT ORGS -0.332 (0.230) 0.136 (0.046)** 
Health     
EXCELLENT 0.563 (0.322)* 0.572 (0.125)*** 
GOOD 0.370 (0.323) 0.457 (0.124)*** 
FAIR 0.240 (0.321) 0.310 (0.124)** 
POOR 0.316 (0.324) 0.192 (0.128) 
MILLS 0.206 (0.338) 0.406 (0.145)** 
WAVE 2 -0.046 (0.047) 0.008 (0.024) 
WAVE3  -0.009 (0.069) -0.009 (0.024) 
WAVE 4 -0.033 (0.076) 0.010 (0.024) 
CONSTANT -0.986 (1.007) 0.141 (0.188) 
N(CLUSTER) 
F(60,  CLUSTER) 
1ST STAGE F(4, CLUSTER)
Hansen J stat χ2(3) 
3558(2173) 
2.750*** 
17.71*** 
1.985 
17503(7764) 
6.600*** 
38.70*** 
0.985 
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Notes: Standard errors robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and the repeat sampling of individuals over time, 
bootstrapped to 1000 replications; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; All 
regressions include controls for region (11), occupation (9) and industry (10); Reference groups: human capital: 
no educational qualifications; firm size: 1-24; sector: private; health: very poor; wave: 1998. 
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 TABLE 4 IV Estimates of Pay Satisfaction by Method of Pay 
 PRP Other 
 Coef. Std.Error Coef. Std.Error 
LNPAY 0.684 (0.262)*** 0.423 (0.176)*** 
MILLS -0.517   (0.314) 0.583 (0.162)*** 
1ST STAGE F(4,CLUSTER) 17.68***  38.58***  
Hansen J Stat χ2(3) 3.714  1.561  
Notes: Standard errors robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and the repeat sampling of individuals 
over time; *** significant at 1%; All regressions include controls for region (11), occupation (9) and 
industry (10); The complete regression output is available from the authors upon request. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1 Selection probit equation of performance pay 
 Coef. Std.Error Marginal Effect 
Identifying variables    
4-5 CD's 0.227 (0.077)*** 0.053 
6-7 CD's 0.177 (0.078)** 0.040 
SPPT -0.098 (0.041)** -0.021 
CAROWN 0.119 (0.038)*** 0.030 
Personal/Job vars    
AGE 0.007 (0.009) 0.001 
AGESQUARE/1000 -0.114 (0.112) -0.016 
SEX 0.027 (0.036) 0.011 
HOURS 0.005 (0.002)** 0.000 
UNION 0.231 (0.034)*** 0.049 
PERMANENT 0.512 (0.079)*** 0.083 
PROMOTION 0.218 (0.028)*** 0.047 
TRAVELTIME 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 
PARTNER 0.069 (0.035)* 0.014 
PAY RISE 0.073 (0.028)*** 0.016 
SECOND JOB -0.038 (0.049) -0.009 
FULL TIME 0.114 (0.065)* 0.025 
Human Capital    
O-LEVELS 0.079 (0.055) 0.018 
A-LEVELS 0.129 (0.062)** 0.031 
OTHER HIGHER 0.077 (0.057) 0.018 
FIRST/HIGHER 0.186 (0.065)*** 0.047 
Firm Size    
25-99 0.127 (0.037)*** 0.029 
100-499 0.180 (0.039)*** 0.042 
500+ 0.272 (0.045)*** 0.065 
Sector    
CIVIL SRV 0.767 (0.074)*** 0.226 
LOCAL GOVT -0.491 (0.072)*** -0.087 
NHS/HIGHER EDU -0.923 (0.100)*** -0.125 
OTHER  0.090 (0.102) 0.020 
NON-PROFIT ORGS -0.494 (0.118)*** -0.081 
Health    
EXCELLENT 0.057 (0.145) 0.006 
GOOD -0.033 (0.143) -0.012 
FAIR 0.014 (0.144) -0.002 
POOR -0.041 (0.146) -0.016 
WAVE 2 0.004 (0.028)  
WAVE3  -0.173 (0.030)***  
WAVE 4 -0.186 (0.031)***  
CONSTANT -2.403 (0.295)***  
N 21293   
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χ2(62) 2546.710***   
Pseudo R2 0.133   
Notes: Standard errors robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and the repeat sampling of individuals over 
time; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; All regressions include controls 
for region (11), occupation (9) and industry (10); Reference groups: identifying variables: less than 3 
CD’s; human capital: no educational qualifications; firm size: 1-24; sector: private; health: very poor; 
wave: 1998; Test of the joint insignificance of the selection variables (Ho: Z=0): χ2 (4) = 25.7***; Test 
of the joint insignificance of the selection variables in an overall job satisfaction equation: F(4, 8468) = 
0.96. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 35
TABLE A2 VARIABLE CODES WITH DESCRIPTION 
Variable Description 
Dependent variables  
OVERALL JS 
 
= respondent satisfaction rating with overall job (1 = ‘not satisfied at all’, 7 = 
‘completely satisfied’) 
PAY = respondent satisfaction rating of following facet of present job: total pay  
 (including overtime and bonuses) 
Identifying variables  
SPPT = 1, if spouse works 1-30 hours, 0 otherwise 
CDINDX  = 0-7 index describing possession of consumer durables (CD’s) in household 
 (CD’s = colour tv, vcr, washing machine, dish washer, home PC, cd player 
 microwave oven - 0 implies no CD’s; 7 implies possession of all CD’s)  
Cdindx: <3 CD’s =1, if possession of less than 3 CD’s, 0 otherwise (omitted) 
Cdindx: 4-5 CD’s =1, if possession of four or five CD’s, 0 otherwise  
Cdindx: 6-7 CD’s =1. if possession of six or seven CD’s, 0 otherwise 
CAROWN =1, if household vehicle is owned by the company, 0 otherwise 
Job and Personal Variables  
PRP =1, if in receipt of performance-related pay, 0 otherwise 
Ln(PAY) = natural log of real usual hourly wage with overtime weighted at 1.3 
AGE = age of respondent at date of interview 
AGESQUARE = age squared 
SEX  =1, if gender is male, 0 otherwise 
HOURS = number of hours normally worked per week  
UNION =1, if union or staff association represents worker at workplace, 0 otherwise 
PERMANENT =1, if contract is permanent, 0 otherwise 
PROMOTION =1, if current job has opportunities for promotion, 0 otherwise 
TRAVELTIME = minutes spent travelling to work 
PARTNER =1, if married or living as couple, 0 otherwise 
PAY RISE =1, if wage rises on incremental scale, 0 otherwise 
SECOND JOB =1, if respondent has second job, 0 otherwise 
FULL TIME =1, if respondent works full-time, 0 otherwise 
Human Capital  
NO QUALIFICATIONS =1, if no educational qualifications, 0 otherwise (omitted) 
O-LEVELS =1, if highest educational qualification is O-levels or equivalent, 0 otherwise 
A-LEVELS =1, if highest educational qualification is A-levels or equivalent, 0 otherwise 
OTHER HIGHER =1, if highest educational qualification is nursing or other higher qualifications 
FIRST/HIGHER =1, if highest educational qualification is teaching qualifications or a first or  
 higher degree, 0 otherwise 
Firm Size  
1-24 =1, if respondent works in 1-24 size plant, 0 otherwise (omitted) 
25-99 =1, if respondent works in 25-99 size plant, 0 otherwise 
100-499 =1, if respondent works in 100-499 size plant, 0 otherwise 
500+ =1, if respondent works in 500+ size plant, 0 otherwise 
Sector  
PRIVATE FIRM =1, if employing organization is private firm/company, 0 otherwise (omitted) 
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CIVIL SRV =1, if employing organization is civil service or central government, 0 otherwise 
LOCAL GOVT =1, if employing organization is local government/town hall, 0 otherwise 
NHS/HIGHER EDU =1, if employing organization is NHS or higher education, 0 otherwise  
OTHER =1, if employing organization is nationalised industry or other sector, 0 otherwise 
NON-PROFIT ORGS =1, if employing organization is non-profit organization, 0 otherwise 
Health  
EXCELLENT =1, if health over the last twelve months has been excellent compared to  
 people of own age, 0 otherwise 
GOOD =1, if health over the last twelve months has been good compared to people  
 of own age, 0 otherwise 
FAIR =1, if health over the last twelve months has been fair compared to people  
 of own age, 0 otherwise 
POOR =1, if health over the last twelve months has been poor compared to people  
 of own age, 0 otherwise 
VERY POOR =1, if health over the last twelve months has been very poor compared to  
 people of own age, 0 otherwise (omitted) 
REGION = a set of 11 dummies for region, coded according to the Government  
 Office Regions classification, taking the value 1 if the respondent lives in  
 the region and 0 otherwise.  The regions are: London, South East, South  
 West, East Anglia, North West, North East, Yorkshire and Humber, East  
 Midlands, West Midlands, Wales, Scotland (omitted: London)  
INDUSTRY = a set of 10 dummies for one-digit industry, taking the value 1 if the  
 respondent’s job belongs to the corresponding industry classification, 0  
 otherwise.  The one-digit industries include:  Agriculture, Forestry and  
 Fishing (omitted); Energy and Water Supply Industries; Extraction of Minerals 
 and Ores other than fuels, Manufacture of Metals, Mineral products and  
 Chemicals; Metal Goods, Engineering and Vehicles Industries; Other  
 Manufacturing Industries; Construction; Distribution, Hotels and Catering,  
 Repairs; Transport and Communication; Banking, Finance, Insurance,  
 Business Services and Leasing; Other Services.  
OCCUPATION = a set of 9 dummies for one-digit occupation, taking the value 1 if the  
 respondent’s job belongs to the corresponding occupational classification, 0  
 otherwise.  The one-digit occupations include: Managers & administrators;  
 Professional occupations; Associate professional & technical occupations;  
 Clerical & secretarial occupations; Craft & related occupations; Personal &  
 protective service occupations; Sales occupations; Plant & machine  
 operatives; Other occupations (omitted: managers and administrators). 
WAVE = a set of four dummies taking the value 1 for observations that belong to  
 the corresponding wave of the BHPS, 0 otherwise.  Years of sample  
 include: 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001 (omitted category: 1998).  
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